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AN OVERVIEW OF THE SEC’S WHISTLEBLOWER
AWARD PROGRAM
Michael H. Hurwitz* and Jonathan Kovacs**
ABSTRACT
In 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act in response to the stock market collapse
and economic downturn as well as the Bernard Madoff scandal and
other well-publicized frauds perpetrated against investors. Among its
numerous provisions, the Dodd-Frank Act amended the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to add a new section—Section 21F—entitled
“Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection.” The DoddFrank Act also directed the Securities and Exchange Commission to
establish an Office of the Whistleblower to administer the provisions
of the new section. The Commission subsequently adopted
regulations that went into effect on August 12, 2011 to implement
these provisions.
This Article will discuss one of the crucial mechanisms of the SEC’s
whistleblower program: the award program. Specifically, this Article
will discuss the eligibility requirements for an award, the factors the
Commission considers when determining an award amount, and the
award review process. This Article also highlights three matters a
potential award applicant should consider before filing for an award:
(1) an applicant will only be eligible if the information was provided
to the Commission after Dodd-Frank was enacted; (2) there must be
a sufficient nexus between the tip provided and the covered
enforcement action for an applicant to be eligible for an award; and
(3) a whistleblower will generally not be eligible to receive an award

* Senior Counsel, United States Securities and Exchange. The United States Securities
and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any
private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed herein
are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or
of the authors’ colleagues on the staff of the Commission.
** Third-year law student at the Georgetown University Law Center and former intern
in the United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s Office of the
Whistleblower.
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if the whistleblower’s information was submitted to the Commission
after the Commission had requested the information, unless the
whistleblower had voluntarily provided the same information to
another agency or self-regulatory organization prior to the
Commission’s request.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”) in response to the
stock market collapse and economic downturn as well as the Bernard
Madoff scandal and other well-publicized frauds perpetrated against
investors.1 Among its numerous provisions, the Dodd-Frank Act
amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) to
add a new section—Section 21F—entitled “Securities Whistleblower
Incentives and Protection.”2 The Dodd-Frank Act also directed the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC” or the “Commission”)
to establish an Office of the Whistleblower (the “OWB”) to administer
the provisions of the new section.3 The Commission subsequently
adopted regulations that went into effect on August 12, 2011 (the “Final
Rules”) to implement these provisions.4
This Article will discuss one of the crucial mechanisms of the
SEC’s whistleblower program: the award program.5 Part I will discuss
1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 922(a), 124 Stat 1376, 1841 (2010).
2. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21F, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012).
3. Section 924(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act directed the Commission to establish a
separate office within the Commission to administer and enforce the provisions of
Section 21F of the Exchange Act. Dodd-Frank Act § 924(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-7.
4. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-1
(2015).
5. Both Section 21F and the Commission’s implementing rule expand antiretaliation protections for whistleblowers. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F2(b). In addition to administering the whistleblower award program, the OWB’s
activities include:






“Communicating with whistleblowers who have submitted tips” and other
information to the agency.
“Staffing a publicly-available whistleblower hotline for members of the public
to call with questions about the program.”
“Reviewing and entering whistleblower tips received by mail and fax into the
Commission’s Tips, Complaints, and Referrals System (the “TCR System”).”
“Working with Enforcement staff to identify and track enforcement cases
potentially involving a whistleblower to assist in the documentation of the
whistleblower’s information and cooperation in anticipation of a potential
claim for award.”
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the statutory requirements to obtain a whistleblower award and the
Commission’s procedures for receiving and considering claims.6 Part I
will also discuss the factors that the Commission considers in
determining the amount awarded to a successful claimant.7 Part II will
then discuss three particular issues concerning the award process based
on the Commission’s publicly-available releases to date: (1) an applicant
will only be eligible if the information was provided to the Commission
after the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted; (2) there must be a sufficient
nexus between the tip provided and the covered enforcement action for
an applicant to be eligible for an award; and (3) a whistleblower will
generally not be eligible to receive an award if the whistleblower’s
information was submitted to the Commission after the Commission had
requested the information, unless the whistleblower had voluntarily
provided the same information to another agency or self-regulatory
organization prior to the Commission’s request.8
I. OVERVIEW OF WHISTLEBLOWER AWARD PROCESS
In order to understand the whistleblower award process, a
whistleblower must first examine the requirements (including the










“Maintaining and updating the OWB website to better inform the public about
the whistleblower program . . . .”
“Identifying and monitoring whistleblower complaints alleging retaliation by
employers or former employers for reporting possible securities law violations
internally or to the Commission.”
“Providing training on the Dodd-Frank Act and the Commission’s
implementing rules to Commission staff.”
“Providing guidance to Commission staff regarding the handling of
confidential whistleblower-identifying information and the handling of
potentially privileged information provided by whistleblowers.”
“Coordinating with Commission staff in making external referrals to other
government agencies consistent with the Dodd-Frank Act’s and the Final
Rules’ confidentiality provisions.”
“Actively publicizing the program through participation in webinars, media
interviews, presentations, press releases, and other public communications.”

SEC, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT
PROGRAM 5-7 (2013).
6. See infra Part I.A.
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. See infra Part II.

TO

CONGRESS

ON THE

DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER
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various exceptions to these requirements) and legal definitions set out in
the Dodd-Frank Act and the Final Rules. We begin with the statutory
authorization for the SEC to pay whistleblower awards. Section 21F
authorizes the SEC to pay awards to eligible individuals “who
voluntarily provide[] original information to the Commission that
le[ads] to the successful enforcement” of actions brought by
Commission, and even, in certain circumstances, other agencies, and
which result in monetary sanctions of more than $1 million.9 Section
21F(b)(1) directs that, if the SEC determines that one or more
whistleblowers are eligible to receive an award and not otherwise
disqualified from receiving an award,10 the whistleblowers will be paid,
in the aggregate, between 10% to 30% of the “monetary sanctions”
collected in the enforcement action.11
Section 21F further states that the determination of the amount of
an award is “in the discretion of the Commission.”12 In exercising this
discretion, Congress mandated that the Commission take into account
three considerations when deciding on an appropriate award percentage:
(1) “the significance of the information provided by the whistleblower to
the success of the” enforcement action; (2) “the degree of assistance
provided by the whistleblower” in the enforcement action; and (3) the
“programmatic interest of the Commission in deterring violations of the
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1); see also id. § 78u-6(a)(1) (defining a “covered judicial
and administrative action”). The Dodd-Frank Act also established a fund that allows the
Commission to pay awards to qualifying whistleblowers and to fund activities of the
SEC’s Inspector General. Id. § 78u-6(g)(1)-(2).
10. Id. § 78u-6(b), (c)(2). However, if an otherwise eligible whistleblower falls
within a number of specific categories delineated in the statute, then the whistleblower
will be barred from receiving an award. These categories include: whistleblowers who
obtained their original information while employed by certain regulatory or law
enforcement agencies or entities, such as the Department of Justice or a self-regulatory
organization, whistleblowers who were convicted of a criminal violation related to the
enforcement action for which they are seeking an award, whistleblowers who obtained
their original information while engaged in performing an audit of financial statements
mandated under the federal securities laws, where the whistleblower’s submission
would be contrary to the requirements of Section 10A of the Exchange Act, and
whistleblowers who fail to submit information to the Commission in such form as the
Commission requires. Id. § 78u-6(c)(2)(D).
11. Id. § 78u-6(b)(1)(A)-(B).
12. Id. § 78u-6(c)(1)(A).
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securities laws by making awards to whistleblowers who provide
information that leads to the successful enforcement of such laws.”13
Since the program’s inception, the Commission has paid awards to
more than a dozen whistleblowers.14 The largest payment to date was an
award that was expected to yield between $30 million and $35 million.15
A. WHISTLEBLOWER AWARD ELIGIBILITY
The Dodd-Frank Act defines a whistleblower as “any individual
who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who provide,
information relating to a violation relating to a violation of the securities
laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation,
by the Commission.”16 The Final Rules provide that this information
encompasses a “possible violation . . . that has occurred, is ongoing, or
is about to occur.”17 The Final Rules also provide that a whistleblower
must be an individual and that “[a] company or another entity is not
eligible to be a whistleblower.”18 Furthermore, whistleblower status is
13. Id. § 78u-6(c)(1)(B). The statute also grants the Commission discretion to
consider “such additional relevant factors as the Commission may establish by rule or
regulation.” Id. § 78u-6(c)(1)(B)(i)(IV).
14. Final Orders of the Commission, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/o
wb-final-orders.shtml [http://perma.cc/F233-55GZ] (listing the final disposition of
applications for awards received by the OWB).
15. Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No.
73174, 2014 WL 4678597, at *1 (Sept. 22, 2014).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6).
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a)(1) (2015). Section 21F(a)(6) defines a whistleblower
as an individual, or individuals acting jointly, who provide “information relating to a
violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or
regulation, by the Commission.” In its adopting release implementing the whistleblower
rule, the Commission explained that the reference in the rule to a “possible violation . . .
that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur” was intended to “provide[] greater
clarity concerning when an individual who provides [the Commission] with information
about possible violations, including possible future violations, of the securities laws
qualifies as a whistleblower” and that “[a]n individual would meet the definition of
whistleblower if he or she provides information about a ‘possible violation’ that ‘is
about to occur.’” Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 64545, 2011 WL
2045838, at *6 (May 25, 2011) [hereinafter Adopting Release].
18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a)(1). This requirement conforms with the statutory
language defining a “whistleblower” as “any individual who provides, or 2 or more
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contingent on an applicant “provid[ing] the Commission with
information pursuant to the procedures set forth in [Rule] 21F-9(a).”19
Even if an applicant meets the definitional whistleblower requirements,
he or she can only become eligible for an award if the information is
submitted “in accordance with the procedures and conditions described
in §§ 240.21F-4, 240.21F-8, and 240.21F-9 of [Rule 21F].”20
If an individual satisfies the definition of a “whistleblower,” the
next inquiry is whether the whistleblower has satisfied the rest of the
criteria for award eligibility. Rule 21F-3 lists four requirements that a
whistleblower must satisfy in order to qualify for an award:21



The whistleblower must have provided information
“voluntarily” to the Commission;22
the information provided to the SEC must qualify as
“original information;23

individuals acting jointly who provide” the specified information. 15 U.S.C. § 78u6(a)(6).
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a)(1). The Final Rules provide two avenues to submit
original information to the Commission: online at www.sec.gov or by mailing or faxing
a Form TCR to the Office of the Whistleblower. Id. § 240.21F-9(a)(1)-(2). In order to
be eligible for an award, a potential whistleblower must also declare that his
information is “true and correct to the best of [his] knowledge and belief.” Id. §
240.21F-9(b). The Final Rules also provide instructions for potential whistleblowers
who wish to provide their information anonymously through an attorney. See id. §
240.21F-9(c). The Final Rules also provide an eligibility window for potential
whistleblowers who provided original information in writing after the enactment of
Dodd-Frank (July 21, 2010) but before the effective date of the rules. See id. § 240.21F9(d); see also infra Part II.A (discussing Dodd-Frank’s enactment date as the earliest
point when information submitted to the Commission is considered “original”).
20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a)(2).
21. Id. § 240.21F-3(a). The four criteria in Rule 21F-3(a) correspond to the four
criteria specified in the Dodd-Frank Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(1) (defining a
“covered judicial or administrative action” as one brought by the Commission that
results in monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million); id. § 78u-6(b)(1) (authorizing
awards to be paid to whistleblowers “who voluntarily provided original information to
the Commission that led to the successful enforcement of the covered judicial or
administrative action, or related action”).
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-3(a)(1).
23. Id. § 240.21F-3(a)(2).
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the information must have “le[d] to the successful
enforcement by the Commission of a federal court or
administrative action;24 and
in its successful enforcement action, the Commission must
have obtained monetary sanctions totaling more than $1
million.25

In addition to these four substantive requirements, the
whistleblower must comply with the procedural requirements and avoid
subjection to the eligibility prohibitions in Rules 21F-8 and 21F-9.26
1. Voluntariness
Voluntariness is satisfied when a whistleblower submits
information to the Commission “before a request, inquiry, or demand
that relates to the subject matter of [the] submission is directed to [the
whistleblower] or anyone representing [the whistleblower]” by either the
Commission, in connection with an investigation, inspection, or
examination by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the
“PCAOB”), or any self-regulatory agency, or in connection with an
investigation by Congress, another federal authority, or a state Attorney
General or securities regulatory authority.27 Voluntariness will not be
satisfied if the whistleblower is required to submit information to the
Commission due to a preexisting legal duty, a contractual duty owed to

24.
25.
26.

Id. § 240.21F-3(a)(3).
Id. § 240.21F-3(a)(4).
Id. § 240.21F-3(a). The Commission is also authorized to pay awards in certain
“related actions.” A “related action” is defined as a “judicial or administrative action
brought by: (i) the Attorney General of the United States; (ii) an appropriate regulatory
authority; (iii) a self-regulatory organization; or (iv) A state attorney general in a
criminal case.” Id. § 240.21F-3(b)(1). An award will be granted in a related action when
one of the above agencies or entities brings its own successful enforcement action based
on “the same original information that the whistleblower gave to the Commission”
leading to the Commission obtaining monetary sanctions totaling more than $1 million,
and that this original information “led to the successful enforcement of the related
action under the same criteria described in these rules for awards made in connection
with Commission actions.” Id. § 240.21F-3(b)(2).
27. Id. § 240.21F-4(a)(1).
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the Commission or the other authorities cited above, or as a result of a
duty mandated by a judicial or administrative order.28
2. Original Information
The information provided must also be original, as defined by the
following criteria:
(i) Derived from [the whistleblower’s] independent knowledge or
independent analysis;
(ii) Not already known to the Commission from any other source,
unless [the whistleblower is] the original source of the information;
(iii) Not exclusively derived from an allegation made in a judicial or
administrative hearing, in a governmental report, hearing, audit, or
investigation, or from the news media, unless [the whistleblower is]
a source of the information; and
(iv) Provided to the Commission for the first time after July 21,
29
2010.

Independent knowledge consists of any “factual information in [the
whistleblower’s] possession that is not derived from publically available
sources,”30 while independent analysis may be the whistleblower’s “own
28.
29.

Id. § 240.21F-4(a)(3).
Id. § 240.21F-4(b). The only substantive change of this definition from how it
appears in the Dodd-Frank Act is the July 21, 2010 cut-off for providing information to
the Commission for the first time. See id. § 240.21F(a)(3). In a recent Second Circuit
decision, the Court rejected a challenge to the July 21, 2010 cut-off date, finding that
the SEC’s interpretation was consistent with Section 21F and reasonable. See Stryker v.
SEC, 780 F.3d 163, 166-67 (2d Cir. 2015); see also infra Part III.A.
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(2). The Adopting Release states that “independent
knowledge must be “derived from a whistleblower’s own experiences, observations, or
communications, and not from information that is available to the general public;
however, the Release makes clear that this knowledge does not have to be direct, firsthand knowledge, since “[s]uch an approach could prevent the Commission from
receiving valuable information about possible violations from whistleblowers who are
not themselves involved in the conduct at issue, but who learn about it through their
observations, relationships, or personal diligence.” Adopting Release, supra note 17, at
*22.
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analysis, whether done alone or in combination with others . . . which
reveals information that is not generally known to the public.” In
contrast to “independent knowledge,” “independent analysis” can be
derived from publically available information, provided that it “reveals
information that is not generally known or available to the public.”31
Information will not generally be deemed to have been derived
from the whistleblower’s “independent knowledge” or “independent
analysis,” and thus will not qualify as “original information” if it was
obtained in certain specified circumstances.32 The Commission
explained its rationale for excluding this information by noting:
[t]he exclusions generally apply to narrow categories of individuals
whose knowledge does not, in our view, constitute “independent
knowledge or analysis of a whistleblower,” because the information
or analysis was acquired by an individual: (1) On behalf of a third
party operating in a sensitive legal, compliance, or governance role .
. . ; or (2) in the performance of an engagement required by the
33
federal securities laws . . . ; or (3) by illegal means.

The Commission further stated that it believed “there are good
policy reasons to exclude information from consideration as
‘independent knowledge’ or ‘independent analysis’ in the hands of
certain persons, and in certain circumstances, where its use in a
whistleblower submission might undermine the proper operation of
internal compliance systems.”34 The Commission emphasized, however,
that it did not “serve[] the purposes of Section 21F to apply this
principle in a manner that creates expansive new exclusions for broad
categories of company personnel (e.g., any supervisor, or any employee
involved in control functions or in processes related to required CEO
and CFO certifications)” and that its approach here “is to adopt more
tailored exclusions for ‘core’ persons and processes related to internal
compliance mechanisms, and to enhance the incentives for employees to
31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(3). “[T]his definition was intended to recognize that
there are circumstances where individuals can review publicly available information,
and, through their additional evaluation and analysis, provide vital assistance to the
Commission staff in understanding complex schemes and identifying securities
violations.” Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *22.
32. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4).
33. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *24.
34. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *31.
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report wrongdoing through their company’s established internal
procedures.”35
The first of these exclusions is for information that was obtained
through a communication that was subject to the attorney-client
privilege, unless disclosure would be permitted by an attorney pursuant
to Part 205.3 of the Commission’s attorney conduct rules, or was
obtained “in connection with the legal representation of a client on
whose behalf [the whistleblower or his] employer or firm are providing
services, and [the whistleblower seeks] to use the information to make a
whistleblower submission for [his] own benefit.”36 In creating this
exclusion, the Commission stated that it “believe[d] this result is
consistent with the purpose of promoting effective enforcement of the
securities laws . . . [since] [c]onsultation with attorneys can improve
compliance on the part of entities and individuals.”37
There are several additional exclusions under the Final Rules for
information obtained by company officials and third parties who assist
companies in investigations of possible violations of the law. These
exclusions are designed, according to the Commission, to ensure that the
persons most responsible for an entity’s conduct and compliance with
law “are not incentivized to promote their own self-interest at the
possible expense of the entity’s ability to detect, address, and self-report
violations.”38 Specifically, these exclusions apply to information
obtained during the course of a company’s internal compliance or audit
activities in the following circumstances:


35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

information obtained from an officer, director, trustee, or
partner of an entity who learned of it because another
person informed that individual of allegations of
misconduct or “in connection with the entity’s processes for
identifying, reporting, and addressing possible violations of
law;”39

Id.
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(i)-(ii).
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *24.
Id.
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(A).

542

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW







[Vol. XXI

information from an employee whose principal duties
involve compliance or internal audit responsibilities, or
who was employed by or otherwise associated with a firm
retained to perform compliance or internal audit functions
for an entity;40
information from an employee or person associated with a
firm retained to conduct an inquiry or investigation into
possible violations of law;41
an employee or someone associated with a public
accounting firm if the information was obtained through a
required accountant’s engagements under federal securities
law;42 and
information obtained from a person already subject to one
of the exclusions, unless the information is “not excluded
from that person’s use pursuant to [these exclusions], or
[the submitter is] providing the Commission with
information about possible violations involving that
person.”43

Finally, the Final Rules exclude information obtained in a manner
that is determined by a court to violate federal or state criminal law.44
The Commission explained that the purpose of this exclusion is to
ensure “that the whistleblower award program not be used to encourage
or reward individuals for obtaining information in violation of federal or
state criminal law—even if the information might otherwise assist our
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(B).
Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(C).
Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(D).
Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(vi). The Commission explained that this exclusion is
intended to “work in tandem with the other exclusions set forth in Rule 21F-4(b)(4) to
preclude submissions in a limited set of circumstances,” such as, for example, “if an
employee only learns about possible violations because he or she is interviewed in the
course of a company internal investigation, Rule 21F-4(b)(4)(vi) will not permit that
employee to file a whistleblower submission claiming the information as his or her
‘independent knowledge’ or ‘independent analysis.’” Adopting Release, supra note 17,
at *38. Another example cited by the Commission is where “a senior company officer,
after receiving a report concerning possible securities violations, gives the information
to his or her assistant.” Id. In such a case, the assistant “will not be able to seek an
award based on the information as long as the officer is barred from doing so.” Id.
44. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iv).
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enforcement of the federal securities laws.”45 It should be noted,
however, that this exclusion does not apply to information obtained in a
manner that violates domestic civil or foreign law (civil or criminal), or
judicial or administrative protective orders.46
The Final Rules also contain several exceptions that may permit
individuals subject to the exclusions to qualify as having provided
“original information” in certain limited circumstances. As noted,
information obtained in the course of a legal representation is generally
excluded from the definition of “independent knowledge” and
“independent analysis.”47 There is an exception to this exclusion in cases
where “disclosure of that information would otherwise be permitted by
an attorney” under certain attorney conduct rules.48 Similarly,

45.
46.

Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *36.
Id. In deciding that the exclusion should not apply to information obtained in
violation of foreign law, the Commission noted that since other countries’ laws often
greatly vary from United States law, it concluded that it was “not in a position to decide
as a categorical rule when it is appropriate to deny an award based on foreign law,”
recognizing that whistleblowers in foreign jurisdictions “may have obligations to
comply with applicable foreign laws,” such as, in some jurisdictions, “criminal
penalties for unlawfully obtaining certain information or for unlawfully disclosing
certain information to authorities outside their borders.” Id. at *36, *36 n.181. With
regard to information obtained in violation of domestic civil law, the Commission
concluded that the exclusion should not apply since it would be “difficult to apply
consistently given the patchwork of state and municipal civil laws that might be
implicated.” Id. at *36. Finally, the Commission explained that it decided not to include
information obtained in violation of protective orders —which, the Commission noted,
are “frequently negotiated between parties to private litigation and are generally
intended to protect proprietary information against public disclosure or improper
use”—since “[i]t would be against public policy for litigants to obtain a protective
order, or to seek enforcement of such an order, for the purpose of preventing the
disclosure of information regarding violations of law to a law enforcement agency. Id.
at *37.
47. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
48. Rules 21F-4(b)(4)(i) and (ii) set out the attorney/legal representation
exclusions, and also set out exceptions to the exclusions. Thus, Rules 21F-4(b)(4)(i) and
(ii) separately provide that the exclusion for information obtained through a
communication that was subject to the attorney-client privilege in connection with the
legal representation of a client on whose behalf the whistleblower or his employer or
firm are providing services will not apply if the “disclosure of that information would
otherwise be permitted by an attorney pursuant to [Part 205 of the Commission’s

544

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXI

information obtained as a result of the whistleblower’s status at the
company or involvement in a company investigation or audit may also
be excluded from being considered “original information.”49
Nevertheless, this otherwise excluded information may, in certain
circumstances, fall within the scope of specified exceptions to the
exclusion. Specifically, the rules provide for an exception to the
exclusion if the whistleblower has a reasonable basis to believe that: (1)
disclosure of the information “is necessary to prevent the relevant entity
from engaging in conduct that is likely to cause substantial injury to the
financial interest or property of the entity or investors;”50 or (2) the
entity is “engaging in conduct that will impede an investigation of the
misconduct.”51 Another exception occurs when “[a]t least 120 days have

attorney conduct rules], the applicable state attorney conduct rules, or otherwise.” 17
C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(i)-(ii).
49. Specifically, these exclusions cover the situations where:
(1) a company’s senior official is informed by another person of allegations of
misconduct, or obtains the information in connection with the company’s processes for
identifying, reporting, and addressing violations of law;
(2) an employee whose principal duties involve compliance or internal audit
responsibilities, or who was employed by or otherwise associated with a firm retained
to perform compliance or internal audit functions for an entity obtains the information
as a result of serving in these capacities;
(3) a person obtains the information as a result of being employed by or
otherwise associated with a firm retained to conduct an inquiry or investigation into
possible violations of law; or
(4) a person obtains the information as a result of being employed by or
otherwise associated with a public accounting firm in connection with “the performance
of an engagement required of an independent public accountant under the federal
securities laws (other than an audit subject to §240.21F-8(c)(4) of this chapter).”
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(A)-(D).
50. Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(v)(A). The Commission explained that “[i]n such cases,
we believe it is in the public interest to accept whistleblower submissions and to reward
whistleblowers—whether they are officers, directors, auditors, or similar responsible
personnel—who give us information that allows us to take enforcement action to
prevent substantial injury to the entity or to investors.” Adopting Release, supra note
17, at *33.
51. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(v)(B). This exception is designed to cover
situations where the whistleblower has a reasonable belief that the entity is acting in
“bad faith,” by, for example, “destroying documents, improperly influencing witnesses,
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elapsed since [the whistleblower] provided the information to the
relevant entity’s audit committee, chief legal officer, chief compliance
officer . . . or [the whistleblower’s] supervisor” unless they were
“already aware of the information.”52
The Final Rules also provide guidance as to whether a
whistleblower can be considered an original source of information to the
Commission if another party previously provided the same information
to the Commission. The general rule states that the Commission will
consider the whistleblower to be the original source of the information if
(1) the information satisfies the definition of original information and
(2) the other source—which can include, as the Adopting Release
clarifies, the whistleblower’s employer53—obtained the information
from the whistleblower or his representative.54 Additionally, if the
or engaging in other improper conduct that may hinder our investigation.” Adopting
Release, supra note 17, at *34.
52. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(v)(C). The purpose of this exception is to allow
potential whistleblowers to know “that they will have a date certain after which they
will no longer be ineligible to make a submission based upon the information in their
possession [and] is not intended to suggest to entities that they have a 120-day ‘grace
period’ for determining their response to the violations.” Adopting Release, supra note
17, at *34. This exception to the exclusion was invoked by the Commission in a recent
award to a company officer on the grounds that the whistleblower “reported the
information to other responsible persons at the entity, as provided for under our rules,
or such persons knew about it, at least 120 days before [the whistleblower] reported the
information to the Commission.” Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim,
Exchange Act Release No. 74404, 2015 WL 860712, at *1 n.1 (Mar. 2, 2015).
53. The Adopting Release explains that an individual would be deemed the original
source of information provided to the Commission by her employer if the individual
had reported the information in the first instance through the “employer’s internal
whistleblower, legal, or compliance procedures for reporting allegations of possible
violations of law, [and] the company later self-reports the individual’s information to
the Commission, and the individual thereafter files a whistleblower submission.”
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *39.
54. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(5); see also Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *19
(noting that “under Rules 21F-4(b)(5) and (6) an individual can be considered the
original source of information provided to the Commission by another source
(including the individual’s employer)” (emphasis added)). The Adopting Release
provides an example to illustrate the applicability of the rule:
[I]f B makes a whistleblower submission based upon information
obtained from A, and A later makes his or her own submission of
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Commission received the information from Congress, federal
authorities, a state Attorney General or securities authority, selfregulatory organizations, or the PCAOB, a whistleblower can still be
considered its original source if he voluntarily submitted the information
and established his status as the original source of the information given
by the other agency.55
If a whistleblower provides information to one of the designated
agencies, entities, or through a company’s internal compliance
procedures for reporting allegations of possible violations of law, and
the whistleblower then submits the same information to the Commission
within 120 days of providing it to the agency, entity, or through a
company’s internal compliance procedures, then the Commission will
consider that the whistleblower provided the information as of the date
the whistleblower had provided it to the agency, entity, or company in
evaluating any later claim for an award submitted by the
whistleblower.56 This provision is designed for the benefit of
that information, then A will be considered the “original source” of
the information (assuming that A establishes his or her status as the
original source and that the information otherwise qualifies as
“original information”).
Id. at *39. The Adopting Release clarifies, however, that A’s status as the “original
source” of the information would not exclude B from award eligibility in this example
because B had obtained the facts underlying his or her submission from A, and those
facts were not derived from publicly available sources, and, thus, B would also be
deemed to have submitted information derived from his or her “independent
knowledge.” Id. As the Adopting Release explained “both submissions could qualify as
‘original information;’ B’s because he or she was first to bring the Commission
information derived from ‘independent knowledge,’ and A’s because he or she was the
‘original source’ of information that, as of B’s submission, was already known to the
Commission.” Id.
55. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(5).
56. Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(7). The Commission had originally proposed a 90-day
period for a whistleblower to submit the information to the Commission in order to
obtain this “lookback” treatment. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *40-41. In
extending this to 120 days, the Commission explained that it felt that the additional 30
days provided a better balancing of the Commission’s “primary goal” to “encourage the
submission of high-quality information to facilitate the effectiveness and efficiency of
the Commission’s enforcement program,” which militated against the proposals some
commentators made for a lookback period of 180 days or longer, as against the
Commission’s goal of encouraging companies to establish “effective programs for
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whistleblowers by providing them with a reasonable period of time to
make their reporting decisions.57
If the Commission already possesses some information about the
matter that the whistleblower provided information for, and the
whistleblower is thus not the original source of the information, a
whistleblower can still be considered an original source for “any
information [provided] that is derived from [the whistleblower’s]
independent knowledge or analysis and that materially adds to the
information that the Commission already possesses.”58
3. Leads to a Successful Enforcement Action
Information is deemed to have led to successful enforcement action
in three circumstances. First, when a whistleblower provided
information that led Commission staff:
to commence an examination, open an investigation, reopen an
investigation that the Commission had closed, or to inquire
concerning different conduct as part of a current examination or
investigation, and the Commission brought a successful judicial or
administrative action based in whole or in part on conduct that was
59
the subject of [the whistleblower’s] original information.

Second, when a whistleblower gave information that “significantly
contributed” to the success of an action already under examination or
investigation “by the Commission, the Congress, any other authority of
the federal government, a state Attorney General or other securities

identifying, correcting, and self-reporting unlawful conduct by company officers or
employees” and to “support . . . the effective functioning of company compliance and
related systems by allowing employees to take their concerns about possible violations
to appropriate company officials first while still preserving their rights under the
Commission’s whistleblower program,” which all militated against a too-short
lookback period. Id. at *41. The Commission stated that it “believe[d] that the balance
struck in the final rule will promote the continued development and maintenance of
robust compliance programs.” Id.
57. Id. at *42.
58. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(6).
59. Id. § 240.21F-4(c)(1).
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regulatory authority, any self-regulatory authority, or the PCAOB.”60
Third, when a whistleblower gave information through an “entity’s
internal whistleblower, legal or compliance procedures” for reporting
securities violations “before or at the same time [the whistleblower]
reported them to the Commission,” and then “the entity later provided
[the] information to the Commission, or provided results of an audit or
investigation initiated in whole or in part in response to information [the
whistleblower] reported to the entity,” provided that the information
satisfies either of the prior two criteria.61
4. Application for Award
If a claimant has so far met the requirements to be considered for
an award, the next step in the analysis is to determine whether he or she
followed the proper procedures for making a claim for award.62
B. DETERMINATION OF AWARD AMOUNT
1. Overview
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, if the SEC determines that one or more
whistleblowers are entitled to receive an award for the assistance they
provided in a particular covered action, or a related action, then they
shall receive, in the aggregate, between 10% to 30% of “what has been
collected of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or related
60. Id. § 240.21F-4(c)(2). In determining what constitutes “significantly
contributing” to the success of an enforcement action, the Commission stated that it will
“look at factors such as whether the information allowed us to bring: (1) Our successful
action in significantly less time or with significantly fewer resources; (2) additional
successful claims; or (3) successful claims against additional individuals or entities.”
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *46.
61. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(c)(3). This latter provision was added by the
Commission “to create a significant financial incentive for whistleblowers to report
possible violations to internal compliance programs before, or at the same time, they
report to us.” Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *46.
62. See infra Part I.C.4. (discussing procedures for making an award claim). If a
claimant has failed to meet any of the required procedures for making a claim set forth
above, he may still be considered for an award upon a showing of “extraordinary
circumstances.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-8(a). A determination of extraordinary
circumstances rests within the sole discretion of the Commission. Id.
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actions.”63 The Dodd-Frank Act placed the actual award percentage
determination within the SEC’s discretion, directing that the SEC
consider the significance of the whistleblower’s information to the
success of the enforcement action, the extent of the assistance provided
by the whistleblower, the SEC’s “programmatic interest” in deterring
the securities law violations involved in the covered action, and other
factors established under the Commission’s rules.64 The Dodd-Frank Act
further bars a disappointed whistleblower from appealing the SEC’s
determination of an award amount to the United States Court of
Appeals.65
As noted, the Dodd-Frank Act provides that the determination of
the amount of an award is “in the discretion of the Commission.”66 In
explaining the parameters to be used by the Commission in exercising
its discretion, the Adopting Release notes that “[s]ince every
enforcement matter is unique, the analytical framework adopted by the
Commission in [Rule 21F-6] provides general principles without
mandating a particular result” and that “no attempt has been made to list
the factors in order of importance, weigh the relative importance of each
factor, or suggest how much any factor should increase or decrease the
award percentage.”67 Rather, the Adopting Release concludes that “[i]n
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2012). Rule 21F-5(c) further provides that
“[i]f the Commission makes awards to more than one whistleblower in connection with
the same action or related action, the Commission will determine an individual
percentage award for each whistleblower, but in no event will the total amount awarded
to all whistleblowers in the aggregate be less than 10 percent or greater than 30 percent
of the amount the Commission or the other authorities collect.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F5(c). The Adopting Release provides an example to illustrate the point: “Thus, for
example, one whistleblower could receive an award of 25 percent of the collected
sanctions, and another could receive an award of 5 percent, but they could not each
receive an award of 30 percent.” Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *53.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(1).
65. See id. § 78u-6(f). Subsection (f) provides that “[a]ny such determination,
except the determination of the amount of an award if the award was made in
accordance with subsection (b), may be appealed to the appropriate court of appeals of
the United States not more than 30 days after the determination is issued by the
Commission.” Id. (emphasis added).
66. Id. § 78u-6(c)(1)(A).
67. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *56; see also Order Determining
Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No. 73174, 2014 WL 4678597, at
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the end, [the SEC] anticipates that the determination of the appropriate
percentage of a whistleblower award will involve a highly
individualized review of the facts and circumstances surrounding each
award using the analytical framework set forth in the final rule.”68 In
addition, the Adopting Release notes, “the absence of any one of the
positive factors does not mean that the award percentage will be lower
than 30 percent, nor does the absence of negative factors mean the
award percentage will be higher than 10 percent.”69 To illustrate this
principle, the Adopting Release offers the example of a whistleblower
who could receive a maximum award even though the whistleblower did
not satisfy certain positive factors, “such as participating in internal
compliance programs,” so long as the whistleblower satisfied other
positive factors, such as “provid[ing] the Commission with significant
information about a possible securities violation and provid[ing]
substantial assistance in the Commission action or related action.”70
The Dodd-Frank Act directs that the award payment be based on
the amount the SEC or other agency actually collects from the
defendants or respondents, not on the amount that the defendants or
respondents are ordered to pay in the covered action or related action.71
Thus, if the sanctions ordered in the covered action amount to $100
million, but the SEC is only able to collect $100,000 from the
defendants, then the amount of any whistleblower award paid by the
Commission in that action will be calculated by multiplying the award
percentage decided upon by the $100,000 of the collected sanctions. If
the Commission collects additional monetary sanctions after an initial
award has been paid, the whistleblower will receive additional award
payments based on these later collections.72

*1 n.4 (Sept. 22, 2014) (noting that “every enforcement action is unique and thus each
award determination involves a highly individualized review of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the particular case”).
68. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *56.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1)(A)-(B).
72. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Additional $150,000 Payment
to Recipient of First Whistleblower Award (Apr. 4, 2014) (noting that the
Commission’s first award recipient under the program received additional payments of
approximately $150,000 since the award was announced on August 21, 2012).
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To date, the SEC has awarded eighteen whistleblowers since the
whistleblower program began nearly four years ago.73 Payouts have
totaled more than $50 million out of an investor protection fund
established by Congress.74 The SEC has also issued at least four
maximum 30% awards.75
73.
74.

See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
Press Release, SEC, SEC Pays More Than $3 Million to Whistleblower (July
17, 2015). The investor protection fund was established pursuant to Section 21F(g) of
the Dodd-Frank Act to fund the payment of awards to whistleblowers under the
whistleblower award program. The fund is financed entirely through monetary
sanctions paid to the SEC by securities law violators, and no money is taken or
withheld from harmed investors to pay whistleblower awards. Id. Four of these
whistleblowers received awards for their assistance in both the SEC enforcement
actions and related actions by other agencies. See Order Determining Whistleblower
Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No. 69749, 106 S.E.C. Docket 2324, 2013 WL
2607652 (June 12, 2013) (approving three whistleblower award claims); Order
Determining Related Action Whistleblower Award Claims, Exchange Act Release No.
70293, 107 S.E.C. Docket 351, 2013 WL 4647206 (Aug. 30, 2013) (approving three
whistleblower award claims in related actions); Order Determining Whistleblower
Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No. 73174, 2014 WL 4678597 (Sept. 22, 2014)
(awarding a whistleblower award claim).
75. See Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release
No. 72652, 109 S.E.C. Docket 2170, 2014 WL 3588057, at *1 (July 22, 2014); Order
Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act. Release No. 72301, 109
S.E.C. Docket 67, 2014 WL 2466464, at *1 (June 3, 2014); Order Determining
Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No. 70775, 107 S.E.C. Docket
2912, 2013 WL 5819624, *1 (Oct. 30, 2013); Order Determining Whistleblower Award
Claim, Exchange Act Release No. 67698, 104 S.E.C. Docket 1620, 2012 WL 3578897
(Aug. 21, 2012). It should be noted that the Commission has, on occasion, redacted the
award percentage and disclosed only the amount of the expected award payment. See,
e.g., Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No.
73174, 2014 WL 4678597, at *1 (Sept. 22, 2014) (noting that in light of the redacted
award percentage and the amount of sanctions collected as of the date of the order, the
whistleblower would be receiving a payment of between $30 and $35 million).
The SEC’s orders authorizing award payments generally have not detailed the
particular information and assistance provided by the successful whistleblowers or the
weight given by the agency to the various positive factors in evaluating the
whistleblowers’ contributions to the success of the enforcement actions. Indeed, as
noted, the publicly-issued orders redact the names of the whistleblowers and, in many
cases, other significant information such as the names of the parties prosecuted by the
SEC. See, e.g., Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act.
Release No. 72947, 109 S.E.C. Docket 3790, 2014 WL 4258232, at *1 (Aug. 29, 2014).
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2. Positive and Negative Factors in Determining Award Percentage
Rule 21F-6 sets out the factors the SEC may apply in making its
award determinations—factors that are reviewed “in relation to the
unique facts and circumstances of each case.”76 Four of these factors
will favor increasing the amount of the award while three other factors
favor decreasing the amount.77 The Commission emphasized that “the
absence of any one of the positive factors does not mean that the award
percentage will be lower than 30 percent, nor does the absence of
negative factors mean the award percentage will be higher than 10
percent.”78 In the event there are multiple qualifying whistleblowers, the
Commission will employ these factors to “determine the relative
allocation of awards among the whistleblowers.”79
In addition to redacting the whistleblower’s name and position in the subject company,
the order also redacted, among other information, the name and date of the enforcement
action, the nature of the violations committed by the defendant(s), and a summary of
the information provided by the successful whistleblower. Id. This is to protect the
confidentiality of whistleblowers, as required by the Dodd-Frank Act, by not disclosing
any information that could reasonably be expected to reveal the identity of a
whistleblower. As noted above, Section 21F(h)(2) of the Exchange Act requires that,
except in certain limited specified circumstances, “the Commission and any officer or
employee of the Commission shall not disclose any information, including information
provided by a whistleblower to the Commission, which could reasonably be expected to
reveal the identity of a whistleblower.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2). The Adopting Release
explains that the Commission “will not reveal the identity of a whistleblower or
disclose other information that could reasonably be expected to reveal the identity of a
whistleblower, except under circumstances described in the statute and the rule.”
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *57.
76. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6 (2015). The Adopting Release emphasizes this point:
Since every enforcement matter is unique, the analytical framework
adopted by the Commission in the final rule provides general
principles without mandating a particular result. Accordingly, no
attempt has been made to list the factors in order of importance,
weigh the relative importance of each factor, or suggest how much
any factor should increase or decrease the award percentage.
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *56.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6.
78. Adopting Release supra note 17, at *56.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6. The Adopting Release explains that the rule “provide[s] for
greater awards for more timely and more useful information, and reduced awards for
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a. Positive Factors
The first three positive factors are set forth in the Dodd-Frank Act.
The fourth positive factor, participation in internal compliance systems,
is not expressly set out in the Dodd-Frank Act but was added pursuant to
the authority granted to the SEC under the Dodd-Frank Act to consider
“such additional relevant factors as the Commission may establish by
rule or regulation.”80 The rule does not list the positive factors in order
of importance.81
whistleblowers whose dilatory or uncooperative conduct may impair our enforcement
efforts.” Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *102.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(1)(B)(i)(IV). In explaining its rationale for adding this
positive factor, and other related factors discussed below, the Adopting Release stated:
In response to concerns expressed by commenters that the proposed
rules could incentivize whistleblowers to bypass corporate
compliance programs, delay reporting violations, or otherwise
interfere with internal compliance systems in order to enhance their
future award, we have taken several steps to address this in the final
rule. First, to reflect the important investor protection role that
corporate compliance programs can serve and increase the incentive
for whistleblowers to participate in these programs, the final rule
includes a positive factor that requires the Commission to assess
whether the whistleblower participated in his or her company’s
internal compliance and reporting systems. Second, to minimize
ongoing investor harm, maximize the deterrent impact of our
enforcement cases, and to discourage delayed reporting by
whistleblowers, the final rule includes a negative factor that requires
the Commission to assess whether the whistleblower substantially
and unreasonably delayed reporting the securities violations. Lastly,
to penalize whistleblowers who attempt to undermine their
employer’s internal compliance or reporting systems, the final rule
includes a negative factor that requires the Commission to assess
whether there is evidence provided to the Commission that the
whistleblower intentionally interfered with his or her company’s
internal compliance systems. Together, these provisions are designed
to give whistleblowers appropriate incentives to report securities
violations voluntarily to their corporate compliance programs and
not to impair the effectiveness of these important programs.
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *57.
81. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a).
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i. Significance of the Whistleblower’s Information
The first positive factor identified by Rule 21F-6(a) provides that
the Commission will “assess the significance of the information
provided by the whistleblower to the success of the Commission action
or related action.”82 The SEC may examine, among other things,
“whether the reliability and completeness of the information . . . resulted
in the conservation of Commission resources.”83 The SEC may also look
at “[t]he degree to which the information provided by the whistleblower
supported one or more successful claims” in the enforcement action.84
While all of the positive factors relate in one way or another to
encouraging whistleblowers to provide helpful information, this factor
focuses on the importance and usefulness of the information to the SEC.
ii. Assistance Provided by the Whistleblower
The second positive factor identified by Rule 21F-6(a) examines
the additional value provided by the whistleblower in assisting the staff
in its investigation and enforcement action. The rule states that in
considering this factor, the SEC may look at, among other things, the
following criteria:




82.
83.
84.
85.

“Whether the whistleblower provided ongoing, extensive,
and timely cooperation and assistance;”85
“timeliness of the whistleblower’s initial report to the [SEC
or, if appropriate,] the internal compliance or reporting
system of the business organizations;”86
“resources conserved [by the SEC] as a result of the
whistleblower’s assistance;”87

Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(1)(i).
Id.
Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(1)(ii).
Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(2)(i). An example of the sort of value-added ongoing,
extensive, and timely cooperation and assistance contemplated by the Rule would be
“helping to explain complex transactions, interpreting key evidence, or identifying new
and productive lines of inquiry.” Id.
86. Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(2)(ii).
87. Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(2)(iii).
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whether the whistleblower “encouraged or authorized
others to assist the staff of the Commission who might
otherwise might not have participated in the
investigation;”88
“efforts undertaken by the whistleblower to remediate the
harm caused by the violations, including assisting the
authorities” in recovering investor money lost as a result of
the violations;89 and
“unique hardships suffered by the whistleblower as a result
of . . . reporting and assisting in the enforcement action.”90

While neither the rule nor the Adopting Release provide further
guidance on what constitutes a “unique hardship,” this factor has been
applied where an employer unlawfully retaliated against a whistleblower
in violation of Section 21F(h) of the Exchange Act.91 The Commission’s
Order noted that the Claims Review Staff considered the “substantial
evidence that the whistleblower suffered unique hardships as a result of
reporting, and also found the Commission’s law enforcement interest to
be compelling given the Commission’s previous findings of unlawful
retaliation against this whistleblower.”92
iii. Law Enforcement Interest
The third positive factor relates to the SEC’s “programmatic
interest” in protecting investors and in deterring violations of the
securities laws.93 This factor focuses on “[t]he degree to which an award
enhances the Commission’s ability to enforce the federal securities laws
and protect investors.”94 The rule provides several examples of
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(2)(iv).
Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(2)(v).
Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(2)(vi).
Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No.
74826, 2015 WL 1907622 (Apr. 28, 2015); see also In re Paradigm Capital Mgmt.,
Exchange Act Release No. 72393, 2014 WL 2704311, at *4-8 (June 16, 2014).
92. Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No.
74826, 2015 WL 1907622, at *1 (Apr. 28, 2015).
93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(3).
94. Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(3)(i).
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circumstances the SEC may take into account in considering its
“programmatic interest,” including the type and amount of harm caused
by the violation and the number of individuals harmed;95 whether the
subject matter of the violation is an SEC priority, “the reported
misconduct involves regulated entities or fiduciaries,” or “the
whistleblower exposed an industry-wide practice” or a long-standing
ongoing violation;96 and whether the announcement of an award
payment “encourages the submission of high quality information from
[other] whistleblowers.”97
iv. Participation in Internal Compliance Systems
The fourth and final positive factor looks at the extent to which the
whistleblower participated in a company’s internal compliance
systems.98 Unlike the three prior positive factors, this positive factor was
not set forth in the Dodd-Frank Act. Rather, this factor was one of a
number of rules that the SEC adopted in order to “incentivize
whistleblowers to utilize their companies’ internal compliance and
reporting systems when appropriate.”99 The Commission expressly
stated in the Adopting Release that “in order to encourage
whistleblowers to utilize internal reporting processes, we expect to give
credit in the calculation of award amounts to whistleblowers who utilize
established internal procedures for the receipt and consideration of
complaints about misconduct.”100 As the Commission has recognized in
this and other aspects of the whistleblower program, “effective internal
compliance programs can in appropriate circumstances provide
significant benefits both in terms of reducing the harm that entities and
investors experience from securities law violations, and in terms of
efficiently assisting our own enforcement efforts.”101

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(3)(iv).
Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(3)(iii).
Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(3)(ii).
Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(4).
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *3.
Id. at *42 n.197.
Id. at *101. In discussing the benefits accruing to the Commission’s
enforcement efforts from an effective internal compliance program, the Adopting
Release noted:
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While this positive factor incentivizes whistleblowers to report
internally, “there are circumstances where a whistleblower may have
legitimate reasons for not wanting to report the information internally,
for example, legitimate concerns about misconduct by the company’s
management or within the internal compliance program, or a reasonable
basis to fear retaliation or personal harm”102 However, the Commission
has recognized that each case is unique, and some factors may not be
applicable or may deserve greater weight than others depending on the
facts and circumstances. For this reason, the absence of any one of the

[I]nternal compliance procedures can complement or otherwise
appreciably enhance our enforcement efforts in appropriate
circumstances. For instance, the subject company may at times be
better able to distinguish between meritorious and frivolous claims,
and may make such findings available for the Commission. This
would be particularly true in instances where the reported matter
entails a high level of institutional or company-specific knowledge
and/or the company has a well-functioning internal compliance
program in place. Screening allegations through internal compliance
programs may limit false and frivolous claims, provide the entity an
opportunity to resolve the violation and report the result to the
Commission, and allow the Commission to use its resources more
efficiently.
Id. at *104 n.450.
102. Id. at *48. While the scope of this article does not cover the anti-retaliation
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, we note that there is currently a split among the
circuit courts as to whether these provisions protect a person who reports a securities
law violation only to a company’s internal compliance and reporting systems, rather
than to the Commission as well. Compare Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720
F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that the Dodd-Frank Act “clearly expresses
Congress’s intention to require individuals to report information to the SEC” to receive
the protections accorded to whistleblowers by the Act’s anti-retaliation provisions and
“reject[ing] the SEC’s expansive interpretation of the term ‘whistleblower’ for purposes
of the whistleblower-protection provision”), with Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801
F.3d 145, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding the Dodd-Frank Act “sufficiently ambiguous”
on the question of whether a person must report to the SEC to obtain the protection of
the Act’s anti-retaliation protections and, therefore, “defer[ring] to the [SEC’s]
reasonable interpretive rule” that accords this protection to persons who report
wrongdoing to their employer, despite not having reported to the Commission).
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positive factors, including participation in internal compliance systems,
will not necessarily preclude a maximum award.103
In considering this factor, the SEC may take into account, among
other things, whether the whistleblower reported internally “before, or at
the same time as, reporting . . . to the Commission,”104 and whether, and
the extent to which, the whistleblower “assisted any internal
investigation or inquiry concerning the reported securities violations.”105
b. Negative Factors
The three negative factors mentioned in the Final Rules are, to
some extent, the antithesis of the positive factors discussed above. For
example, if instead of utilizing his employer’s internal compliance
system to report a concern, a whistleblower interferes with his
company’s internal compliance system, the SEC will assess this fact in
determining an award calculation. Furthermore, if instead of cooperating
and assisting the SEC in its investigation, a whistleblower unreasonably
delayed reporting a violation to the SEC, this will also be treated as a
negative factor in determining the whistleblower’s award percentage.
i. Interference with Internal Compliance and Reporting Systems
While reporting internally is a positive factor in the Commission’s
award determination, if the whistleblower’s interaction with his or her
company’s internal compliance system had the effect of “undermining
the integrity” of the system, this will instead constitute a negative factor
in the Commission’s analysis.106 The rule states that, in considering this
factor, the Commission will take into account whether the whistleblower
knowingly: (1) interfered with his entity’s established legal, compliance,
or audit procedures “to prevent or delay detection of the reported

103. See id. at *56 (“[a] whistleblower who provides the Commission with
significant information about a possible securities violation and provides substantial
assistance in the Commission action or related action could receive the maximum
award regardless of whether the whistleblower satisfied other factors such as
participating in internal compliance programs”).
104. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(4)(i).
105. Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(4)(ii).
106. Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(3).
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securities violation”;107 (2) made “materially false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statements or representations that hindered the entity’s efforts
to detect, investigate, or remediate the reported securities violations”;108
and (3) “provided any false writing or document knowing the writing or
document contained any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or
entries that hindered an [employer’s] efforts to detect, investigate, or
remediate the reported securities violations.”109
ii. Whistleblower’s Culpability
If a whistleblower participated in the securities violation, this may
count as a negative factor and cause an award to be reduced depending
upon the extent of the whistleblower’s culpability or involvement in the
violation.110 The rule lists a number of factors that the SEC may take
into account in determining whether to consider the whistleblower’s
participation as a negative factor in its award determination. These
factors essentially cover two primary areas: (1) the extent of the
whistleblower’s participation;111 and (2) the whistleblower’s background
and knowledge.112
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.







112.



Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(3)(i).
Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(3)(ii).
Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(3)(iii).
Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(1).
The factors covered by this category include:
“The whistleblower’s role in the securities violations.” Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(1)(i);
“Whether the whistleblower acted with scienter . . . .” Id. § 240.21F6(b)(1)(iii);
“Whether the whistleblower financially benefitted from the violations.” Id. §
240.21F-6(b)(1)(iv);
“The egregiousness of the underlying fraud committed by the whistleblower.”
Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(1)(vi); and
“Whether the whistleblower knowingly interfered with the Commission’s
investigation of the violations . . . .” Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(1)(vii).
The factors covered by this category include:
“The whistleblower’s education, training, experience, and position of
responsibility at the time the violations occurred.” Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(1)(ii);
and
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In addition, although culpability does not per se bar an individual
from receiving a whistleblower award (unless the individual is
criminally convicted for his role in the violation),113 any monetary
sanctions imposed on a culpable whistleblower or on an entity the
liability of which is attributable largely to the whistleblower’s conduct
will not count toward either the $1 million award threshold set out in
Rule 21F-10 or the amount of sanctions collected for purposes of paying
on an award.114 The purpose of this rule is to ensure that culpable
whistleblowers do not benefit financially from their own misconduct or
misconduct for which they are substantially responsible.115
While a culpable whistleblower may still be eligible to receive a
whistleblower award, this does not mean that the whistleblower cannot
be charged in an enforcement action by the SEC for his misconduct.116
iii. Unreasonable Reporting Delay
A whistleblower who unreasonably delays reporting a violation to
the SEC could face a reduction in the award percentage he or she



“Whether the whistleblower is a recidivist.” Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(1)(v).

113. As noted above, otherwise eligible whistleblowers who were convicted of a
criminal violation related to the enforcement action for which they are seeking an award
will be barred from receiving an award. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2)(B) (2012).
114. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-16. The Commission explained in the Adopting Release
why it rejected the suggestion of many commentators for barring culpable
whistleblowers:

[W]e do not believe that a per se exclusion for culpable
whistleblowers is consistent with Section 21F of the Exchange Act.
By allowing certain less-culpable whistleblowers to receive awards
consistent with the limitations set forth in the final rules, we have
provided incentives for persons involved in wrongdoing to come
forward and disclose illegal conduct involving others while limiting
awards to those whistleblowers.
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *57.
115. Id. at *90.
116. See id. at *90 n.391 (noting that a culpable whistleblower may not only hurt his
or her chances of receiving an award but that he or she can also be “prosecuted for his
[or her] involvement in the misconduct”).
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receives.117 In deciding whether a whistleblower’s delay in reporting
was unreasonable, the SEC may take into account, among other things,
the reasons for the delay, and whether the whistleblower was aware of
the relevant facts but failed to take reasonable steps to report or prevent
the violations from occurring or continuing, or only reported them after
learning about a related inquiry, investigation, or enforcement action.118
This rule is meant to incentivize whistleblowers to promptly report
violations and to provide a disincentive for tardy reporting.119
C. AWARD REVIEW PROCESS
The whistleblower award process is a multistep review where an
applicant informs the SEC why they are entitled to an award, the SEC
then examines the application to determine if the claim should be
granted, and, if so, the amount that should be paid to the successful
claimant. We have previously discussed the requirements for qualifying
for an award and the analysis undertaken by the SEC in deciding upon
the award percentage for successful applicants. In this section, we will
discuss how the SEC conducts its award review process and the rights
available for claimants to contest the decisions made by the SEC.

117.
118.
119.

17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(b)(2).
Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(2)(i)-(ii).
The Commission stated in the Adopting Release that the purpose of this
negative factor is “to minimize ongoing investor harm, maximize the deterrent impact
of our enforcement cases, and to discourage delayed reporting by whistleblowers.”
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *57. The Commission further explained that:
Rule 21F-6 allows the Commission to set the award percentage
based, among other things, on the significance of the information
provided by the whistleblower and any unreasonable delay by the
whistleblower in making the submission. Taken together, these rules
provide for greater awards for more timely and more useful
information, and reduced awards for whistleblowers whose dilatory
or uncooperative conduct may impair our enforcement efforts.
Id. at *102.
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1. Posting a Notice of Covered Action
As discussed above,120 whenever an SEC enforcement action results
in monetary sanctions totaling more than $1 million, the OWB will post
a “Notice of Covered Action” (“NoCa”) on its website.121 Once the
OWB publishes a NoCA, a whistleblower has 90 days from the date of
publication to file a claim of award, or else the claim will be barred.122
All claims must be submitted on Form WB-APP, which must be signed
and submitted to the OWB by mail or fax.123 A claimant can no longer
remain anonymous at this stage, and his or her identity must be
disclosed on Form WB-APP.124
To ensure that all potential whistleblowers who may have
contributed to the success of the enforcement action are provided with
the opportunity to submit a claim and to make their case for why they
are entitled to an award, the SEC provides notice through the NoCA
posting procedure.125 As the Commission recognized, the posting of a
NoCA “provides the best mechanism to provide notice to all
whistleblower claimants who may have contributed to the action’s
success [and] . . . ensure that all potential claimants have a fair
120.
121.

See supra Part I.A.4.
See Claim an Award, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/owbawards.shtml [http://perma.cc/S26Y-L6RQ].
122. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(a). The Commission reasoned:
[T]his 90-day period strikes an appropriate balance between
competing whistleblower interests—allowing all potential
whistleblowers a reasonable opportunity to periodically review the
Commission’s website and to file an application, on the one hand,
but providing finality to the application period so that the
Commission can begin the process of assessing any applications and
making a timely award to any qualifying whistleblowers, on the
other hand.
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *79.
123. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(b). The Form WB-APP can be found at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formtcr.pdf [http://perma.cc/99DA-Y5L8]. Claimants
can also submit information through the Commission’s Tips, Complaints, and Referral
System, which can be found at http://denebleo.sec.gov/TCRExternal/index.xhtml
[http://perma.cc/UY5F-YJAS].
124. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(c).
125. Id.
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opportunity to pursue an award claim.”126 In addition, to the extent the
Enforcement staff has worked closely with a particular whistleblower
during the course of the investigation and enforcement action, the OWB
will generally contact the whistleblower to ensure that the whistleblower
is aware of the posting and the deadline for submitting an award
application.127
2. Claims Review: Staff Review and Preliminary Determination
Beyond this initial intake and preliminary review, the SEC will not
begin reviewing award applications until the time for filing any appeals
of the underlying enforcement action has expired, or where an appeal
has been filed, after all appeals in the action have been concluded.128
The review is conducted by the Claims Review Staff, which is the staff
designated by the Director of the Division of Enforcement to evaluate
all timely whistleblower award claims submitted on Form WB-APP in
accordance with the criteria set forth in the whistleblower rules.129 In
connection with this process, the OWB may require whistleblowers to
“provide additional information relating to their eligibility for an award
or [to show] satisfaction of any of the conditions for an award.”130
In making its decision, the Claims Review Staff may rely upon the
whistleblower’s award application, sworn declarations from the staff
that worked on the successful enforcement action, the relevant orders
and pleadings, and other appropriate materials.131 The Claims Review
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *79.
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(d).
Id. In the Adopting Release, the Commission explained that the Director of
Enforcement “may designate staff from the Enforcement Division, the Office of the
Whistleblower, or other Commission divisions or offices to serve on the Claims Review
Staff, either on a case-by-case basis or for fixed periods, as the Director deems
appropriate.” Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *80.
130. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(d); Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *77.
131. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-12(a). In addition to the applicant’s Form WB-APP, the
staff’s views (in the form of a sworn declaration), and the orders and pleadings, the
Claims Review Staff may also review: (i) transcripts of the enforcement proceedings,
including any exhibits; (ii) any appellate decisions or orders; and (iii) any other
documents or materials, including sworn declarations, from third-parties that are
received by the OWB and can help the Claims Review Staff to resolve the claimant’s
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Staff may review the whistleblower’s Form TCR including attachments
and other related materials provided by the whistleblower to assist the
Commission’s investigation. In listing these various documents that the
Claims Review Staff and Commission may rely upon in making its
determination, the Commission explained that “specifying the materials
that we may rely upon will promote transparency and consistency in the
claims review process.”132
Following the evaluation of the claim, the Claims Review Staff will
issue a Preliminary Determination recommending whether it should be
allowed or denied, and, if allowed, the proposed award amount that
should be granted.133 In its Preliminary Determination, the Claims
Review Staff will explain the reasons for its decision.134 The OWB will
then sends copies of the Preliminary Determination to the claimants,135
along with a letter outlining the claimants’ rights under the
whistleblower rules to request the record reviewed by the Claims
Review Staff and to contest the Preliminary Determination.
3. Contesting a Preliminary Determination
If a whistleblower wishes to contest a Preliminary Determination,
he needs to submit a written response to the OWB explaining the
grounds for objecting to either the denial of an award or the proposed
amount of an award.136 Before deciding to contest a Preliminary
Determination, a whistleblower may request that the OWB provide for
his review the materials that formed the basis of the Claims Review

award application, including information related to the claimant’s eligibility. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.21F-12(a)(1)(iii), (v), (6).
132. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *83.
133. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(d).
134. See, e.g., SEC Claims Review Staff, Preliminary Determination of the Claims
Review Staff, Notice of Covered Action 2011-194 (June 16, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/orders/owb-2011-194-final-081514.pdf [http://pe
rma.cc/7GA6-XH8F] (denying the claim because there was no evidence showing that
the claimant had provided information to the Commission relating to the Covered
Action or any other Commission matter).
135. Id.
136. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(e).

2016]

AN OVERVIEW OF THE
SEC'S WHISTLEBLOWER AWARD PROGRAM

565

Staff’s Preliminary Determination.137 This request must be submitted to
the OWB within 30 days of the date of the Preliminary Determination.138
While a whistleblower has the right to review the materials that
formed the basis of the Claims Review Staff’s Preliminary
Determination, this right has certain limitations. First, the whistleblower
is not entitled to obtain any materials beyond those that formed the basis
of an award determination.139 Thus, a whistleblower does not have the
right to review the investigative files or to interview the Enforcement
staff. Second, a whistleblower is not entitled to review “pre-decisional
or internal deliberative process materials that are prepared exclusively to
assist the Commission in deciding the claim.”140 Finally, the OWB may
make redactions as necessary “to comply with any statutory restrictions,
to protect the Commission’s law enforcement and regulatory functions,
and to comply with requests for confidential treatment from other law
enforcement and regulatory authorities.”141 For example, in the case
where the Claims Review Staff issues a Preliminary Determination for
multiple whistleblowers applying for the same covered action, the OWB
will usually redact identifying information about the other
whistleblowers from the materials provided to each whistleblower so as
not to “out” one claimant to the other co-award claimants.142
In forwarding these materials to a whistleblower, the OWB may
require the whistleblower to sign a confidentiality agreement before
receiving the materials.143 The confidentiality agreement will cover all

137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. § 240.21F-10(e)(1)(i).
Id.
Id. § 240.21F-12(b).
Id.; see also Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *84 (pointing out that “[t]hese
materials are by their nature pre-decisional work product that may often contain the
staff’s frank discussion of legal and policy making materials, and the disclosure of these
materials would have a chilling effect on our decision-making process” (internal
quotation omitted)).
141. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-12(b); Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *84.
142. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2)(A) (2012) (providing that, with certain exceptions,
“the Commission and any officer or employee of the Commission shall not disclose any
information, including information provided by a whistleblower to the Commission,
which could reasonably be expected to reveal the identity of a whistleblower”).
143. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-12(b).
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non-public information provided to the whistleblower.144 It will also
include a provision that a violation of the agreement may lead to the
whistleblower’s ineligibility to receive an award.145
During the same 30-day period that a whistleblower has to request
the materials that formed the basis of the Preliminary Determination, the
whistleblower can also request a meeting with the OWB to discuss the
Preliminary Determination.146 The decision on whether to grant a
request for a meeting is within the sole discretion of the OWB, and the
OWB may choose to decline the request.147 If the OWB grants a request
for a meeting, the OWB will listen to the whistleblower’s concerns and
answer questions about the claims-review process.148
If a whistleblower decides to contest a Preliminary Determination,
he or she must submit his or her written response and supporting
materials within the later of: (1) 60 days of the date of the Preliminary
Determination; or (2) “if a request to review [the Claims Review Staff]
materials is made,” then within 60 days of when the OWB provided the
materials for the whistleblower’s review.149 If a Preliminary
Determination recommends denying a whistleblower’s claim and the
whistleblower chooses not to contest the Preliminary Determination, or
fails to submit a timely response contesting the Preliminary
Determination, then the Preliminary Determination will become the
final order of the Commission, and the whistleblower will be deemed to

144. “The addition of the reference to ‘non-public’ information that ‘the
Commission provides’ clarifies that the rule does not limit the whistleblower’s use of
information that he or she already knows, or learns from other sources, and does not
acquire through our investigation.” Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *62.
145. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-8(b)(4).
146. Id. § 240.21F-10(e)(1)(ii).
147. Id.
148. The Adopting Release does suggest that the OWB could use these meetings “in
appropriate cases as an opportunity to reach a tentative agreement with a meritorious
whistleblower on the terms of a Proposed Final Determination, which could then be
presented to the Commission for approval.” Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *79
n.350. In such a case, the Claims Review Staff would have determined that the
whistleblower should receive an award and the only issue would be the amount of the
award.
149. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(e)(2).
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have failed to exhaust his or her administrative remedies and will be
prohibited from appealing the denial to the courts.150
A whistleblower can also contest a Preliminary Determination in
which the Claims Review Staff recommended the granting of an award
if the whistleblower wishes to dispute the amount of the award
recommendation. In such instance, the whistleblower will need to
comply with the same deadlines applicable to whistleblowers receiving
a denial recommendation.151 However, if a whistleblower fails to timely
protest a Preliminary Determination recommending the granting an
award, this will not convert the Preliminary Determination into a Final
Order of the Commission, but rather will convert it to a Proposed Final
Determination for the Commission’s final consideration152 because,
under the whistleblower rules, the Commission has the ultimate
authority to authorize award payments.153
If a whistleblower submits a timely response contesting a
Preliminary Determination, then the Claims Review Staff will
reconsider the whistleblower’s claim and issue a Proposed Final
Determination. In reviewing the whistleblower’s request for
reconsideration, the Claims Review Staff will examine “the issues and
grounds” raised by the whistleblower, “along with any supporting
documentation” provided.154
When the Claims Review Staff issues a Proposed Final
Determination, either in response to a timely request for reconsideration
or as a result of a recommendation to pay an award, the OWB will
notify the Commission of the Proposed Final Determination.155 Within
30 days of receiving this notice, any Commissioner can, if he or she
chooses, request that the full Commission review the Proposed Final

150. Id. § 240.21F-10(f). As the Adopting Release explains, “a claimant’s failure to
submit a timely response to a Preliminary Determination where the determination was
to deny an award would constitute a failure to exhaust the claimant’s administrative
remedies, and the claimant would be prohibited from pursuing a judicial appeal.”
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *78.
151. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(f); Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *78.
152. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(f); Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *78.
153. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(h).
154. Id. § 240.21F-10(g).
155. Id. § 240.21F-10(h).
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Determination.156 If no Commissioner requests a review within the 30day period, then the Proposed Final Determination will become the
Final Order of the Commission. “In the event a Commissioner requests a
review, the Commission will review the record that the [Claims Review
Staff] relied upon in making its determinations . . . and issue its Final
Order.”157 Once the Commission issues its Final Order, the OWB will
promptly forward it to the whistleblower(s).158
4. Appealing the SEC’s Final Order
The Dodd-Frank Act provides that the SEC’s Final Orders on
whistleblower award applications “shall be in the discretion of the
Commission.”159 This discretion includes decisions on “whether, to
whom, or in what amount to make awards.”160 With regard to the
amount awarded, the Dodd-Frank Act specifically states that “[t]he
determination of the amount of an award . . . shall be in the discretion of
the Commission.”161 Indeed, the statute goes further and provides that
the determination of the amount of an award is not appealable “if the
award was made in accordance with subsection (b).”162 However, the
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id. § 240.21F-10(i). As noted, the whistleblower rules direct the OWB to send
claimants the Preliminary Determination and the Final Order. See id. § 240.21F-10(d),
(i). There is no requirement for OWB to send claimants the Proposed Final
Determination. Thus, there is no provision in the rules for a claimant to contest a
Proposed Final Determination (aside from a Preliminary Determination recommending
an award, which, as discussed above, will be deemed a Proposed Final Determination
for purposes of Rule 21F-10(h)).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(1)(A) (2012).
160. Id. § 78u-6(f).
161. Id. § 78u-6(c)(1)(A).
162. Id. § 78u-6(f). As discussed above, Section 21F(b)(1) directs that if the SEC
determines to pay a whistleblower award, the award must be at least 10%, and not more
than 30%, of the “monetary sanctions” that have been collected in the enforcement
action. See supra notes 11, 71 and accompanying text. The whistleblower rules clarify
that not only are award determinations not appealable if they fall within the Dodd-Frank
Act’s 10% to 30% parameters, but so too are “any factual findings, legal conclusions,
policy judgments, or discretionary assessments involving the Commission’s
consideration of the factors in [Rule] 21F-6.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-13(a). This is further
clarified in the Adopting Release where the Commission stated, “when the Commission
makes an award between 10 and 30 percent, and that determination is based on the
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denial of an award “may be appealed to the appropriate court of appeals
of the United States not more than 30 days after the determination is
issued by the Commission.”163 Under Section 25(a)(1) of the Exchange
Act and Rule 21F-13(a), appeals of final orders of the Commission can
be made to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, or to the circuit where the aggrieved person resides or
has his or her principal place of business.164
Under the Final Rules, “the record on appeal shall consist of the
Preliminary Determination, the Final Order of the Commission, and any
other items from those set forth in [Rule] 21F-12(a) . . . that either the
claimant or the Commission identifies for inclusion in the record.”165
However, “the record on appeal shall not include any pre-decisional or
internal deliberative process materials that are prepared exclusively to
assist the Commission in deciding the claim, (including the staff’s Draft
Final Determination in the event that the Commissioners reviewed the
claim and issued the Final Order).”166
II. CONSIDERATIONS FOR PROSPECTIVE AWARD APPLICANTS
A. INFORMATION SUBMITTED PRE-DODD-FRANK DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR
AN AWARD: STRYKER V. SEC
As noted above, the Dodd-Frank Act defined “original
information” as information that is: (1) “derived from the
[whistleblower’s] independent knowledge or [independent] analysis;”
(2) not already known to the Commission; and (3) not derived from a
previous judicial, administrative, or government proceeding.167 The
factors set forth in Rule 21F-6, our final order regarding the amount of an award
(including the award allocation among multiple whistleblowers) is not appealable.”
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *84.
163. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(f).
164. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 25(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1); 17 C.F.R. §
240.21F-13(a).
165. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-13(b).
166. Id. The exclusion of pre-decisional and internal deliberative process materials
from the record on appeal mirrors the prohibition in Rule 21F-12(b) against a
whistleblower who wishes to review or receive those materials in advance of making a
decision on contesting a Preliminary Determination.
167. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(3)
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Final Rules also made clear that the information must be provided after
July 21, 2010, the date of the Dodd-Frank Act’s enactment.168
As noted in the Adopting Release, the July 21 cut-off reflects the
fact that:
Congress enacted Section 21F in order to provide new incentives for
individuals with knowledge of securities violations to report those
violations to the Commission. [The SEC] believe[d] that applying
Section 21F prospectively—for new information provided to the
Commission after the statute’s enactment and not to information
previously submitted—is most consistent with Congressional intent
169
and with the language of the statute.

In support of this interpretation, the Commission noted that Section
924(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act expressly states that a whistleblower’s
written information will not lose the status of original information even
if it is submitted prior to the effective date of the Final Rules, i.e.,
August 12, 2011, so long as it “is provided by the whistleblower after
the effective date of this subtitle,” i.e., July 21, 2010.170
The Commission’s decision to deny an award application because
the whistleblower’s information had been submitted before the
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act was recently upheld by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In Stryker v. SEC, the
whistleblower did not dispute that he had provided information to the
Commission prior to July 2010.171 He contended, however, that the
provision of Rule 21F-4(b) requiring that “original information” must
have been submitted after that date was “contrary to the statute” because
this requirement is not part of the statutory definition of “original
information.”172
The Second Circuit rejected this contention outright. The court
noted that the two-step analysis for determining whether an agency’s
rule is a permissible interpretation of the authorizing statute was set out
in the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural

168.
169.
170.

Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *18-19.
Id. at *19 (emphasis added).
Id. at *19 n.94 (quoting Dodd-Frank Act § 924(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-7(b))
(emphasis added).
171. Stryker v. SEC, 780 F.3d 163, 165 (2d Cir. 2015).
172. Id. at 165.
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Resources Defense Council, Inc.173 In describing the familiar analysis
prescribed by Chevron, the Second Circuit stated that the first step is to
see, by reviewing the statute and, if need be, the legislative history,
whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue.”174 If it has, “the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”175 If, however, the
court cannot conclude that Congress has directly spoken on the matter,
then, under the Chevron analysis, the court is instructed to “defer to an
agency’s interpretation of the statute it administers, so long as it is
reasonable.”176
In applying the first step of the Chevron analysis, the Second
Circuit noted that, while Section 21F(a)(3) is silent as to whether
information submitted prior to the Dodd-Frank Act’s enactment
qualifies as “original information,”177 other provisions in Section 21F are
clear that “a putative whistleblower must provide the requisite
information in the form and manner required by SEC’s rules and
regulations” and that “‘original information’ had to be submitted in
conformity with the SEC’s rules and regulations.”178 The Second Circuit
173.
174.

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Stryker, 780 F.3d at 165 (quoting New York ex rel. N.Y. State Office of
Children & Family Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Admin. for Children
& Families, 556 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 2009)).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 166 (characterizing Section 21F(a)(3) as “leav[ing] a number of loose
ends”).
178. Id. (citing to the statutory definition of whistleblower found in Section
21F(a)(6), and the general statutory authorization in Section 21F(j) granting the
Commission “the authority to issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary or
appropriate to implement the provisions of this section consistent with the purposes of
this section”). The court also noted the statutory prohibition against awarding
whistleblowers who “fail[] to submit information to the Commission in such form as
the Commission may, by rule, require.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2)(D).
Recognizing that “[s]uch rules and regulations [were] of necessity promulgated
sometime after [the statute] was passed,” the court pointed out that Congress created an
express safe-harbor for information that was submitted after the Dodd-Frank Act’s
enactment but before the effective date of the Final Rules, provided that the information
was submitted in writing. Stryker, 780 F.3d at 166 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u–7(b)). Rule
21F-9(d) gave effect to this safe-harbor by providing that original information
submitted in writing after July 21, 2010, but before the effective date of these rules will
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further stated that “if the purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act was to
encourage whistleblower activity, already completed actions would
arguably not qualify.”179 While all of this would appear to show a
congressional intent to limit awards only to whistleblowers who
submitted original information after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank
Act, the Second Circuit did not need to reach a definitive finding that
Congress clearly intended this result during the first part of the Chevron
analysis. Even if the Dodd-Frank Act was ambiguous on this point, the
Second Circuit ruled that the Commission’s decision to impose a July
21, 2010 cut-off date was a reasonable interpretation of the Dodd-Frank
Act’s whistleblower provisions and thus was entitled to deference under
the second part of the Chevron analysis.180 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court emphasized that Congress clearly “delegated to the SEC
rulemaking authority to implement the whistleblower award program
and specific authority to determine the ‘form and manner’ in which
information had to be submitted in order to qualify as ‘original
information.’”181
Stryker’s holding is clear: under the Final Rules, only information
submitted after the July 21, 2010 cut-off will be considered original
information. Therefore, whistleblowers that have submitted information
around the period of the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act should ensure
that their information was submitted after the cut-off. Otherwise, the
OWB will refuse to consider the information as basis to make an award.
B. NEXUS REQUIRED BETWEEN TIP AND COVERED ACTION
The Final Rules require that, in order to be eligible for an award, a
whistleblower’s tip must have led to the success of the enforcement
be deemed to satisfy the requirements for submitting original information under the
Final Rules. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 167.
181. Id. at 166. As further support that Rule 21F-4(b)(b)(iv) is consistent with
Congress’s intent, the court pointed to the safe-harbor provision of 15 U.S.C. § 78u–
7(b), discussed in supra note 170, which provides a limited exception from the
requirement that “original information” must be submitted pursuant to the SEC’s rules
for information submitted after enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act and prior to the
effective date of the Final Rules. This limited exclusion, the court stated,” supports an
inference that Rule 21F–4(b)(1)(iv) is consistent with legislative intent.” Id.

2016]

AN OVERVIEW OF THE
SEC'S WHISTLEBLOWER AWARD PROGRAM

573

action for which he or she seeks an award.182 This means that the
whistleblower’s information must be “sufficiently specific, credible, and
timely” to have caused the Commission to open an investigation and
bring an action based in whole or in part on the conduct the
whistleblower described, or must have otherwise significantly
contributed to the success of the action.183 As the Commission stated in
the Adopting Release:
[I]n assessing whether information ‘led to’ a successful enforcement
action, we will examine the relationship between the information in
a submission and the allegations in the Commission’s complaint
filed in the civil action or order filed in the administrative
proceeding. Our inquiry will focus on whether the submission
identifies persons, entities, places, times and/or conduct that
correspond to those alleged by the Commission in the judicial or
administrative action. . . . In applying [the significantly contributed]
standard, among other things we will look at factors such as whether
the information allowed us to bring: (1) our successful action in
significantly less time or with significantly fewer resources,
additional successful claims; (2) additional successful claims; or (3)
184
successful claims against additional individuals or entities.

In deciding whether to submit an award application, whistleblowers
should carefully read the description of the Covered Actions posted on
the OWB’s website and examine the extent to which their information is
related to the subject matter of the covered action.185 Whistleblowers are
also encouraged to review the public pleadings in a judicial covered
action, particularly the complaint, injunctive orders, and final
judgment(s).186
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See supra Part I.A.3.
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(c)(1) (2015).
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *45-46.
See Claim an Award, supra note 121.
See
Public
Access
to
Court
Electronic
Records
(PACER),
http://www.pacer.gov/ (offering case and docket information from federal appellate,
district, and bankruptcy courts). The whistleblower can also find the pleadings at other
websites. See, e.g., LexisNexis CourtLink, http://courtlink.lexisnexis.com; Westlaw
CourtExpress, http://courtexpress.westlaw.com/; Justia Dockets & Filings, http://docket
s.justia.com/. The Adopting Release advised that, as part of its analysis, the
Commission

574

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXI

Repeated failure to establish this nexus can result in sanctions
against a claimant. In one extreme example, the OWB determined that a
claimant had failed to establish a factual nexus between the claimant’s
tips and 143 separate covered actions for which the claimant had
submitted award applications.187 In the Final Order, the OWB noted that

may consider whether, and the extent to which, the information
included: (1) Allegations that formed the basis for any of the
Commission’s claims in the judicial or administrative action; (2)
provisions of the securities laws that the Commission alleged as
having been violated in the judicial or administrative action; (3)
culpable persons or entities (as well as offices, divisions, subsidiaries
or other subparts of entities) that the Commission named as
defendants, respondents or uncharged wrongdoers in the judicial or
administrative action; or (4) investors or a defined group of investors
that the Commission named as victims or injured parties in the
judicial or administrative action.
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *45.
187. See SEC Claims Review Staff, Preliminary Determination of the Claims
Review Staff 2 (May 12, 2014) [hereinafter SEC Claims Review Staff Order on May
12, 2014], http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/orders/owb-multiple-final-051214.pdf
[http://perma.cc/U2VB-JDDW] (noting that the claimant had, in fact, submitted award
applications for 196 covered actions, of which 143 were specifically reviewed in the
Final Order); see also SEC Claims Review Staff, Preliminary Determination of the
Claims Review Staff (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/orders/ow
b-final-031913.pdf [http://perma.cc/5L45-5EYX] (noting that of the fifty-three
applications reviewed in the Final Order, the Commission had previously denied fiftyone of these in March 2013 finding that the claimant’s tip did not lead to the successful
enforcement of any of the covered actions); SEC Claims Review Staff, Preliminary
Determination of the Claims Review Staff (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/rules/oth
er/2015/owb-order-final-080515-2.pdf [http://perma.cc/A8K6-7PT3] (determining that
a claimant who failed to object had similarly failed to establish a factual nexus between
the claimant’s tips and twenty-five separate covered actions for which the claimant had
submitted award applications). The Final Order of August 5, 2015 found that certain
statements made in the claimant’s Form TCRs, emails to Commission officials, and
applications for awards were “patently false or fictitious” and that “Claimant’s
submission of whistleblower award applications on Form WB-APP in which Claimant
declares that Claimant is entitled to an award are patently false given that the WB-APPs
Claimant has filed to date lack even a remote factual nexus to the covered actions for
which Claimant is seeking an award.” SEC Claims Review Staff, Preliminary
Determination of the Claims Review Staff, at 1 (Aug. 5, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2015/owb-order-final-080515-2.pdf [http://perma.cc/A8
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the vast majority of the claimant’s award applications “lack[ed] even a
superficial factual nexus to the covered actions for which [the
whistleblower was] seeking an award.”188 The Final Order found that the
whistleblower had repeatedly submitted “vague, unsupported, and
utterly incredible” information in the whistleblower’s Form TCRs, Form
WB-APPs, and other various communications with the OWB, and that
the whistleblower’s continued submission of Form WB-APPs lacked
“any factual nexus to the covered actions.”189 The Final Order further
stressed that the whistleblower had “persistent[ly] refus[ed] to withdraw
numerous unsupported claims or to change . . . behavior in spite of
repeated requests” by the OWB.190 Accordingly, the Final Order
determined that not only were the claimant’s 143 award applications to
be denied, but also, invoking the Commission’s authority under
Exchange Act Rule 21F-8(c)(7),191 declared that the claimant would no
longer be eligible to be considered for a whistleblower award “in any
future covered or related actions,” and the OWB was directed to
K6-7PT3]. The Final Order also determined that “Claimant’s knowing and willful state
of mind in making these statements is evidenced by the following: (i) the vague,
unsupported, and utterly incredible nature of Claimant’s statements in Appendix B [of
the Final Order]; (ii) Claimant’s submission of the WB-APPs that lack any factual
nexus to the covered actions; and (iii) Claimant’s refusal to withdraw numerous
unsupported claims in spite of repeated requests and explanations by the Office of the
Whistleblower.” Id. at 1-2.
188. SEC Claims Review Staff Order on May 12, 2014, supra note 187, at 2
(including a six-page Appendix B that contained a list of numerous “vague,
unsupported, and utterly incredible” statements made by the claimant in the claimant’s
TCRs, emails to Commission officials, and Form WB-APP submissions).
189. Id.
190. Id. (detailing the numerous attempts the OWB made to explain to claimant the
basic premise of the whistleblower award program and the necessity for their being a
factual nexus between a whistleblower’s tip and covered action for which the
whistleblower requests an award. The Final Order noted that the OWB had repeatedly
warned the claimant that repeatedly filing claims for whistleblower awards that have no
relation to the facts in the underlying matter will not result in an award under the
whistleblower program).
191. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-8(c)(7) (2015) (providing that a whistleblower is not
eligible to be considered for an award if the whistleblower “knowingly and willfully
make any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation, or use any false
writing or document knowing that it contains any false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or entry with intent to mislead or otherwise hinder the Commission”).
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“summarily reject all pending and future whistleblower award claims”
submitted by the whistleblower.192 The Final Order explained that the
whistleblower’s “unceasing submission of baseless claims has harmed
the rights of legitimate whistleblowers and hindered the Commission’s
implementation of the whistleblower program by, among other things,
delaying the Commission’s ability to finalize meritorious awards to
other claimants and consuming significant staff resources.”193
As the Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement recognized
when the Commission adopted the Final Rules, “the whistleblower
program is designed to incentivize insiders and others who possess
useful information regarding unlawful conduct to come forward early
and assist the SEC with identifying and bringing enforcement actions
against companies and individuals that have violated the securities
laws.”194 This case illustrates the importance for the whistleblower of
taking the time to ensure that there is a factual connection between the
information furnished to the Commission and the subject matter of the
covered action before deciding whether to apply for a whistleblower
award.
C. AWARD ISSUES IN CONNECTION WITH TIPS SUBMITTED TO OTHER
AGENCIES OR SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS OR AT SEC’S PRIOR
REQUEST
Not infrequently, a whistleblower decides to submit a tip to both
the SEC and one or more other agencies or self-regulatory organizations
such as FINRA. Indeed, the whistleblower rules incentivize
whistleblowers to provide information to other agencies or selfregulatory organizations by authorizing the SEC to pay additional
awards for assistance provided in related actions of certain other
192.
193.
194.

SEC Claims Review Staff Order on May 12, 2014, supra note 187, at 3.
Id. at 2-3.
Robert S. Khuzami, Dir. of Enf’t, SEC, Remarks at Open Meeting –
Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch05
2511rk.htm [http://perma.cc/FG6E-H2CK]; see also Order Determining Whistleblower
Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No. 72947, 2014 WL 4258232, 109 S.E.C.
Docket 3790, at *3 (Aug. 29, 2014) (denying an award claim where, in part, the
Commission was unable to discern “how [the claimant’s] information could have led to
the successful enforcement of the Covered Action given the absence of any relevant
factual connections between the two”).
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agencies.195 However, despite this incentive for multiple-agency
reporting, the rules contain some potential pitfalls for whistleblowers
that wish to be rewarded for such conduct. In this section, we will
highlight some of these pitfalls and discuss the options open to
whistleblowers in such instances.
As discussed above, the Commission is authorized to pay an award
to a whistleblower who voluntarily provides the agency with original
information that leads to its bringing a successful enforcement action in
which it obtains monetary sanctions totaling more than $1 million.196
When information is provided to the SEC after the SEC requested the
information or after it was provided to another agency, the question may
arise as to whether it was provided “voluntarily” to the SEC. Rule 21F4(a)(1) states that information will be deemed to have been provided
“voluntarily” to the SEC if it was provided:
before a request, inquiry, or demand that relates to the subject matter
of your submission is directed to you or anyone representing you
(such as an attorney): (i) By the Commission; (ii) In connection with
an investigation, inspection, or examination by the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, or any self-regulatory organization; or
(iii) In connection with an investigation by the Congress, any other
authority of the federal government, or a state Attorney General or
197
securities regulatory authority.

Rule 21F-4(a)(2) clarifies that, in determining whether a “request,
inquiry, or demand” was received, it does not matter whether the
whistleblower was compelled to provide the information by a subpoena
or other applicable law. Thus a simple informal request will suffice.198 In
the Adopting Release, the Commission explained that the reason for this
was “to create a strong incentive for whistleblowers to come forward

195. See supra Part II.B. Section 21F(a)(5) requires that a related action must be
“based upon the original information . . . that led to the successful enforcement of the
Commission action.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(5) (2012). As the Adopting Release makes
clear, this means that a whistleblower cannot recover in a related action absent a
successful Commission action. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *10.
196. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
197. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(a)(1) (2015).
198. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *11-12.
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early with information about possible violations of the federal securities
laws, rather than wait to be approached by investigators.”199
With one exception, any prior request from the SEC will cause a
whistleblower’s information submission to be deemed not voluntary.
The one exception applies if the whistleblower “voluntarily provided the
same information to one of the other authorities identified above [i.e.,
the PCAOB, other self-regulatory organizations, Congress, other federal
agencies, state Attorneys General or securities regulatory authorities]
prior to receiving a request, inquiry, or demand from the
Commission.”200 In the Adopting Release, the Commission explained
that this exception:
is intended to respond to comments that, as proposed, our rule could
have had the unintended consequence of precluding a submission
from being considered as ‘voluntary’ in circumstances where the
whistleblower provided the information to another authority, the
other authority referred the matter to the Commission, and our staff
contacted the whistleblower before he or she had the opportunity to
201
file a whistleblower submission with us.

With regard to all other SEC prior requests, the Adopting Release
explained that the Commission decided to count all of these as not
voluntary, regardless of whether the request was made in connection
with an investigation, inspection or examination, because it “believe[d]
that a whistleblower award should not be available to an individual who
makes a submission after first being questioned about a matter (or
otherwise requested to provide information) by the Commission staff
acting pursuant to any of our investigative or regulatory authorities.”202
Thus, for example, even a request for information from a nonenforcement division at the SEC will prevent the whistleblower’s
199.
200.
201.

Id. at *11.
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(a)(2).
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *16 n.81. It should be noted that the
example provided in the Adopting Release covers a situation where “the other authority
referred the matter to the Commission.” Id. (emphasis added). The Adopting Release
did not discuss the situation where a whistleblower provides information to another
agency in response to a routine regulatory inquiry and then, without any contact from
the other agency, the SEC staff reaches out to the person for the same information in
connection with its own inquiry.
202. Id. at *14.
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subsequent submission from being deemed voluntary, provided, of
course, that the request “relates to the subject matter of [the
whistleblower’s] submission.”203
The rule makes an important distinction between requests from the
SEC and requests from other agencies/entities. While prior requests
from the SEC, with the one exception noted above, will cause a
whistleblower’s information submission to be deemed not voluntary,
when it comes to prior requests from other agencies/entities, prior
requests of certain types will cause the whistleblower’s submission to be
deemed not voluntary. As the Commission explained in its Adopting
Release:
Only an investigative request made by one of the other designated
authorities will trigger application of the rule, except that a request
made in connection with an examination or inspection, as well as an
investigative request, by staff of the PCAOB or a self-regulatory
organization will also render a whistleblower’s subsequent
submission relating to the same subject matter not “voluntary.” This
provision recognizes the important relationship that frequently exists
between examinations and enforcement investigations, as well as our
regulatory oversight of the PCAOB and self-regulatory
204
organizations.

Thus, in certain circumstances information is considered as
provided voluntarily even though it was submitted in response to an
SEC request, as when the whistleblower first voluntarily reported to
another agency and that agency referred the matter to the Commission.
On the other hand, information that was submitted to the SEC without a
prior Commission request may be considered voluntarily. An example
would be when another federal agency had requested the same
information in connection with that agency’s investigation before the
whistleblower submitted it to the SEC.205

203.
204.
205.

17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(a)(1).
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *14.
A claimant who cannot satisfy the “voluntary” requirement will not be able to
obtain relief through the extraordinary circumstances exception found in Rule 21F-8(a).
The extraordinary circumstances exception only applies to failures to comply with the
procedural requirements “for submitting information and making a claim for an award”
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CONCLUSION
With this Article, it is our goal to provide an overview of the SEC’s
whistleblower award program to help future claimants and their counsel
better understand the award eligibility requirements and the criteria for
determining the amount of any award paid by the Commission. With
this goal in mind, we wish to emphasize a few key points. First,
whistleblowers should make all possible efforts to understand and
comply with the procedural requirements, including the deadlines for
submitting a claim, so as not to be deemed ineligible for award
consideration. For example, as upheld by Stryker, a claimant cannot be
considered for an award if he or she only provided information to the
SEC prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. Furthermore,
whistleblowers who seek an award should review any NoCa posted to
the SEC website and their corresponding judicial proceedings to ensure
that there is a sufficient nexus between their tip and the success of the
action. Finally, while whistleblowers are incentivized to report evidence
of wrongdoing to other regulatory authorities as well as, if appropriate,
the internal compliance personnel at their company, they should be
cognizant of the rules relating to the voluntariness of tips provided to the
SEC so that they do not inadvertently run afoul of this requirement and
thereby be deemed ineligible for award consideration. It is our hope that
this Article will provide rightful claimants with helpful guidance as they
prepare their whistleblower award applications so as to maximize their
chance of receiving a favorable award determination and further
encourage potential whistleblowers to come forward with the vital
information that is crucial to the success of SEC enforcement actions
and the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower program.

specified in Rules 21F-9 through 21F-11, and does not apply to substantive
requirements such as those found in Rule 21F-4.

